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VOLUME 49 FALL, 1996 NUMBER 3
HYPERLEXIS AND THE LOOPHOLE
WALTER D. SCHWIDETZKY*
L Introduction
In this article I would like to continue the discussion on the need to control
"hyperlexis," the term coined two decades ago by Dean Manning' to describe the
"pathological condition caused by an overactive law-making gland."' Unfortunately,
Congress and its regulatory bodies have become hyperlexic to an extreme. As De
Tocqueville noted, if we see a problem, we throw a law at it.' Complexities are
piled on top of complexities. Attempts to eliminate ambiguities rarely succeed; a
law that resolves one ambiguity typically spawns many more. This whole process
stems, I think, from the deluded belief that it is possible to have a perfect legal
system. It is not. Humans are imperfect, and therefore so will be anything they
© 1996 Walter D. Schwidetzky
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1. See Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 767 (1977); Gordon
D. Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis- The Most Important "Law and...," 43 TAX LAW. 177 (1989);
Richard M. Lipton, "We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us": More Thoughts on Hyperlexis, 47 TAx
LAW. 1 (1993); see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reflections on the Regulation Process: "Do
Regulations Have to be Complex" or "Is Hyperlexis the Manna of the Tax Bar," 51 TAX NOTES 1441,
1442-43 (1991); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1992); John A. Miller, Indetenninacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification
in the Law of Taxation, 68 VASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity. Reform and
the Illusion of Tax Simplification, 2 GeO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319 (1994). For a dissenting view, see
Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
2. Manning, supra note 1, at 767.
3. Quoted in id. at 772.
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create. Frederich Hayek hoped that "our generation may have learned that it has
been perfectionism of one kind or another that has often destroyed whatever degree
of decency societies have achieved. ' '4 His hopes seem in vain.
Tax law is, of course, a case of hyperlexis run extraordinarily amok. Indeed, the
Internal Revenue Code has gotten so out of hand that quite radical reform proposals
are now on the table. Some commentators have suggested that we repeal the income
tax law altogether and replace it with a value added tax or other substitute.! It has
been estimated that we spend $157 billion a year complying with the federal income
tax laws, That amount of money is roughly equivalent to the value of the
automobile output of Ford Motor Corporation and one-third of the output of
Chrysler Corporation.6
Much of the hyperlexis in the tax area masquerades as reform. The massive Tax
Reform Act of 1986, pitched to the public via media as "tax simplification," served
to increase the length of the tax code substantially This article reviews one of the
primary causes of hyperlexis in tax law, an obsessive desire to close tax
"loopholes." It does not seem to matter how big the loophole is, how many people
are using it, or how much revenue is being lost. Many innocent transactions are
invariably caught in the undertow of loophole closure. While no solid figures appear
to be available, I suspect that the revenues gleaned by closing many loopholes are
often offset by revenue losses resulting from economic inefficiency and compliance
costs generated -by the new law. This is not to suggest all loopholes should be left
wide open. Many do need to be closed. One would hope, though, that when
loopholes are closed, Congress would keep hyperlexis principles in mind. In the
past this has rarely been the case: Most often the law is complicated further, while
opportunities for simplification are passed by.
The discussion will focus on my own area of interest, partnership taxation.
Subchapter K (which contains most of the partnership tax provi~ions) has been the
subject of numerous efforts to close supposed loopholes and thus provides fertile
4. FRIEDREICH A. HkYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 8 (1960) (referencing 2 DAVID HuME,
ESSAYS 371, 373 (1742)).
5. See, e.g., U.S. Rep. Benjamin Cardin, Speech to the Maryland Bar Association Tax Section (Apr,
23, 1996) (Representative Cardin is a fairly liberal Democrat). In June 1995, Chairman Archer of the
House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on replacing the income tax with another type of tax,
including a value added tax (VAT). See Alan Shenk, Japanese Consumption Tax After Six Years: A
Unique VAT Mature, 69 TAX NOTES 899, 900 (1995); see also Report of the National Commission on
Economic Growth and T x Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 413 (1996) (also known as the Kemp Commission
Report) (recommending a move toward a flat tax); Armey-Shelby Flat Tax, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong.
(1996), S. 1050, 104th Cong. (1996) (would replace the current system with a 17% flat tax mostly on
wages, pension distributions and cash flow of businesses, while increasing'the standard deduction); S.
722, 104th Cong. (1996) (introduced by Senators Nunn & Domenici) (also known as the USA tax
(unlimited savings account)) (would permit individuals to deduct savings from taxes and replace the
corporate income tax withi a VAT).
6. Cardin, supra note 5. Representative Cardin was quoting the Tax Foundation, a conservative
Washington, D.C., think tank. According to Cardin, the Tax Foundation estimates compliance costs with
all tax laws to be $250 billion. See id.
7. The increase forced many publishers to switch from one volume to two.
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ground for this review. The areas I have chosen for analysis are the changes to the
partnership contribution and distribution rules' and rules governing payments to
retiring partners
Each of these areas plays an important role within subchapter K. The changes
that have been made are of very recent origin and thus provide a good snapshot of
the viability of hyperlexis principles today. Sections 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 reveal
a particularly vivid demonstration of hyperlexis. The "reformers" have used a
sledgehammer to kill a fly of a loophole. I recommend they be repealed. The
amendments to I.R.C. § 736 illustrate how even when changes are needed, they are
made in a way that needlessly complicates the law. I recommend a simpler
approach.
IL Partnership Contribution and Distribution Rules
A. Background
Ordinarily, contributions of property to and distributions of property from a
partnership are made on a tax-free basis; no gain or loss is recognized."
Congress was concerned that these rules could be used to disguise what in substance
is a sale or a taxable exchange.' For example, assume that A wants to sell
8. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 737 (1994).
9. See id. § 736.
10. See id. §§ 721, 731.
11. See id. §§ 721,731(a). An exception is made for distributions of cash in excess of basis, when
gain is recognized. See id. § 731(a)(1). A partner can recognize a loss on a distribution in liquidation
of his interest if he receives only money, unrealized receivables and inventory, and the amount of cash
and carryover basis in the property is less than his basis in his partnership interest. See id. § 731(a)(2).
12. In a famous transaction, May Department Stores (May Co.) took advantage of these provisions
while avoiding the repeal of General Utilities. The General Utilities doctrine stands for the proposition
that a corporation need not recognize a gain or loss on the distribution of property to its shareholders.
See BORIS I. BrrrKER & JAMES S. EUsTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 8.20 (6th ed. 1996). The 1986 Act largely repealed what was left of the doctrine. See
I.R.C. §§ 311(b), 336(a) (1994).
It could have sold or distributed to its shareholders a real estate subsidiary's appreciated stock worth
$550 million, and recognized substantial gain under I.R.C. §§ 1001 or 31 1(b), respectively. Instead May
Co. formed a partnership with a PruSimon. May Co. and the PruSimon were equal partners. PruSimon
contributed $550 million to the Partnership. May Co. contributed the stock of the subsidiary. If the form
of the transaction is honored, both contributions are tax-free transactions under I.R.C. § 721. The
partnership then used the cash to purchase $550 million of May Co. stock in the open market.
(Technically, the stock was actually purchased from May Co., which had purchased it in a self tender.)
For accounting purposes the transaction is treated as a redemption by May Co. of half of its stock held
by the Partnership in exchange for half of the stock of its subsidiary. The reason for this result is that,
by entering into the partnership, May Co. effectively gave up ownership of one-half of the stock of the
subsidiary and obtained an interest in one-half of its own stock that the partnership purchased. Had it
been treated as a redemption for tax purposes, May Co. would have recognized gain on the half of the
subsidiary stock exchanged for its stock. I.R.C. § 311(b). To complete the tax avoidance scheme, at a
later date the partnership could have distributed the May Co. stock to May Co. and the subsidiary stock
to PruSimon. These distributions would have arguably been tax free under I.R.C. § 731(a)(1). Since this
would liquidate the partnership, each partner would take a basis in the distributed property equal to its
1996]
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substantially appreciated property to B. A straight sale is taxable under I.R.C.
§ 1001. Instead A and B form a partnership. A contributes the property; B
contributes cash that he would otherwise have used to buy the property. A's
contribution of the property to the partnership is ordinarily tax free under I.R.C.
§ 721. Thereafter, tl-e partnership liquidates, distributing the property to B and the
cash to A. Distributions (in liquidation or otherwise) from a partnership to a partner
are ordinarily tax free under I.R.C. § 733. Thus, it appears that A and B, by using
the partnership tax rules, can turn what in substance is a taxable sale into a tax-free
transaction. B, on distribution of the property, takes a basis in the property equal
to the basis in his partnership interest. 13 Thus, B receives a full cost basis in the
property.
In this highly simplified example of what is commonly referred to as a "mixing
bowl transaction" there are, however, a few problems. Even without statutory
disapproval, if A and B are the only partners, a court most likely would apply the
step transaction doctrine to classify the transaction as a sale. 4 If in order to avoid
the step transaction doctrine A and B remain partners for a meaningful period of
time, they both share the risks of change in the value of the property, unless they
agree to allocate all appreciation and loss to B 5 and manage it exclusively for B's
benefit. Again, if they take these steps, substance over form principles might treat
the original transaction as a sale. Assuming those problems can be overcome, there
is yet another difficulty. If A receives a distribution of cash in excess of his basis
in the partnership interest, he recognizes gain to the extent of the excess." Since
A's basis in his partnership interest is equal to the basis of the contributed
property, 7 when A receives the money contributed by B, A still recognizes all of
the gain inherent in the property on contribution. Also, I.R.C. § 751(b) and/or I.R.C.
§ 736(a) insure thuit any ordinary income inherent in the contributed property is not
converted into capital gains. Thus, without more facts, the stated transaction
basis in its partnership interest, I.R.C. § 732(b). Thus eventually May Co. could have (and may in fact
have) effectively exchangcA its subsidiary stock for its own stock on a tax-free basis. A direct exchange
would have been fully taxable under I.R.C. §§ 1001 or 311 (b).
* In response to the May Co. transaction, the Service promptly issued Notice 89-37, 1989-1 C.B. 679.
This notice indicated that from the date of the notice similar corporate transactions will be effectively
treated for tax purposes in the same manner as it is for accounting purposes. Applying this rule to the
May Co. transaction would have meant that May Co., upon the partnership's purchase of its stock, would
have been deemed to have redeemed its own stock for the PruSimon stock, making any gain inherent
in the PruSimon stock taxable to May Co. under I.R.C. § 31 l(b). Since the Notice was prospective only,
however, it did not apply to the May Co. transaction. See Lee A. Sheppard, May Department Stores and
the Use of Partnerships to Avoid Asset Gain Recognition, 45 TAX NOTES 23 (1989); see also Mark P.
Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47 TAx L. ReV. 173, 177 (1991),
13. See I.R.C. § 732(b) (1994).
14. The step transaction doctrine requires interrelated steps of an integrated transaction to be taken
as a whole rather than be treated separately. See BORRIS I. BITrKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 1.3[5] (2d ed. 1995); see aLvo infra note 20.
15. Under I.R.C. § 704(b) (1994).
16. See id. § 731(a)(1).
17. See id. § 722.
18. Under I.R.C. § 751(b), if as aresultofa non-pro rata distribution the partnership and the partner
[Vol. 49:403
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offers A no great benefit. But, those additional facts might exist. A may be a
partner in an existing partnership and have a substantial basis in his partnership
interest. The other partners could agree (or A could have sufficient bargaining
power to force the other partners) to permit B to temporarily be a partner to effect
the transaction. As this discussion demonstrates, it was not all that easy to "beat the
system," but under the original rules of subchapter K it was possible, and on
occasion did happen.19
Congress responded in 1984 with I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B). It provides that when
there is a transfer of money or property to a partnership and there is a related
transfer of money or property by the partnership to the contributing partner, the
transfers will be treated as a sale or exchange if that is their substance." Somewhat
belatedly, in 1992 the Service promulgated final regulations under I.R.C.
§ 707(a)(2)(B)!' The regulations provide that if a distribution to a partner occurs
within two years of the contribution by that same partner, the transactions are
presumed to be related." Sales or exchange treatment results unless the
presumption is rebutted with "facts and circumstances clearly establishing that the
transfers do not constitute a sale."' Thus, the example discussed above most likely
would not survive muster under I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B), provided the parties
"complete" the transaction and distribute the property and cash within two years.
If no distribution occurs within two years, the transactions are presumed to be
unrelated unless the facts and circumstances clearly establish that the transfers
exchange interests in ordinary income and nonordinary income property, a phantom, taxable exchange
is deemed to occur which is designed to insure that all the partners recognize their fair shares of ordinary
income inherent in "unrealized receivables (defined in I.R.C. § 751(c) to include I.R.C. § 1245 ordinary
recapture gain inherent in partnership property) and substantially appreciated inventory. I.R.C. § 736(a)
has a comparable, and somewhat redundant rule, that applies when payments are made to a retiring
partner and the partnership holds "unrealized receivables," defined by reference to I.R.C. § 751(c). See
infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Otey v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 312 (1978), affd per curiamn, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir.
1980).
20. See I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B). Actually, even prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B), there
was authority in the regulations to attack abusive transactions, though it was rarely used. Section 1.721-
l(a) of the Treasury Regulations provides:
In all cases, the substance of the transaction will govern, rather than its form .... Thus,
if the transfer of property by the partner to the partnership results in the receipt by the
partner of money or other consideration, including a promissory obligation fixed in
amount and time for payment, the transaction will be treated as a sale or exchange under
section 707 rather than as a contribution under section 721.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1960); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3) (1960) (having similar effect).
21. The proposed regulations were originally published in the Federal Register on April 25, 1991.
See 56 Fed. Reg. 19055 (1991). They encompassed regulations § 1.707-0 and §§ 1.707-2 through -9,
under I.R.C. § 707(a)(2). The proposed regulations were adopted as revised on September 30, 1992. See
57 Fed. Reg. 44974 (1992) (codified at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.707-0, 1.707-2 to -9 (1992)).
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(1) (1992).
23. Id. § 1.707-3(d). If the distribution occurs more than two years after the contribution, the
contribution and distribution are presumed to be unrelated unless facts and circumstances clearly establish
that the transfers constitute a sale. See id.
1996]
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constitute a sale.' Nonsale treatment is typically quite appropriate. If the parties
are willing to stay in partnership over two years, there is unlikely to be any real
abuse. As equal partners, both A and B are at risk for changes in the value of the
property. Further, the I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) regulations now specifically address
partnership allocations of gains and losses that might effectively neutralize the risk
to A during the two-year waiting period. If such allocations exist, the regulations,
applying the equivalent of substance over form principles, treat the property and
cash as exchanged on contribution to the partnership?
B. The Attack
Section 707(a)(2)(B) was not seen by Congress as a sufficient weapon to address
mixing bowl transactions. In 1989, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(BY and
in 1992, I.R.C. § 737.27 These provisions should be subordinate to I.R.C.
§ 707(a)(2) and only apply to the extent it does not." Although I.R.C.
§§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 strengthen the government's ability to address certain
abuses, they are far too broad in scope and, consistent with hyperlexis principles,
create numerous other problems.
Under I.R.C. § 7C4(c)(1)(B), if property contributed by a partner is distributed to
another partner within five years of the contribution, the contributing partner is
required to recognize the gain or loss she would have recognized under I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(A)r as though the property had been sold. I.R.C. § 737 addresses
partners who contribute property to the partnership and within five years receive a
distribution of other property from the partnership. I.R.C. § 737 requires the
contributing partner to recognize a gain (but not a loss) to the extent of the lesser
of the "net precontribution gain" or the amount by which the fair market value of
the distributed property exceeds the partner's basis in her partnership interest." The
net precontribution gain is the gain that would have been recognized by the partner
under I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) if all of the property contributed by the partner within
five years of the actual distribution had been distributed to another partner." Under
24. See id. § 1.707-3(d).
25. See id. § 1.707-3(0 ex. 8.
26. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7642, 103 Stat. 2106,
2379-81 (1989).
27. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
28. See Terence F. Cuff, The Section 737 Regulations - Part I, at 6 (July 12, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, forthcoming in the Journal of Partnership Taxation) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review)
[hereinafter Cuff 1].
29. Under I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A), income, gain, loss, and deduction with respect to property
contributed by a partner is shared among the partners so as to take account of the variation between the
basis and the fair market value of the contributed property. Thus, if a partner contributed property with
a loss inherent in it, when the partnership sold the property the loss would be allocated to the
contributing partner after adjusting for any depreciation deductions allocated to the partner which reduced
the variation between the original basis and fair market value of the property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
3(b)(1), (2) ex. 1() (as -'mended in 1995).
30. See I.R.C. § 737(a) (1994).
31. See id § 737(b).
.408 [Vol. 49:403
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both I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737, the partner's basis in the partnership interest
and the partnership's basis in the property is adjusted for the gain or loss recog-
nized.32
I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 are entirely mechanical. If a taxpayer falls within
their provisions, the relevant gain or loss is recognized. There is no need for a
factual demonstration on the part of the taxpayer or the Service as to whether the
contributions and distributions actually are related. They can in fact be completely
unrelated. There is an argument that I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 represent tax
simplification, providing a bright line test rather than the fuzzy one of I.R.C.
§ 707(a)(2)(B). The simplification comes at the expense of equity, since unrelated
contributions and distributions are brought within the coverage of the code.
However, given the Kafkaesque nature of the code, a bit of inequity might be a
cheap price to pay for genuine simplification. If the substitution of a bright line is
all that was achieved by I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737, it would be hard to argue
against their existence. Alas, there is more.
C. Utopia Lost
One difficulty is that both I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 can apply at the same
time. If two partners each contribute property to the partnership, and within five
years the property contributed by one partner is distributed to the other, both code
sections apply. The calculations can become complex.33
Another difficulty with both code sections is the time frame. Congress did not
explain why a five-year time frame was chosen. It is improbable that anyone
32. See id. §§ 704(c)(l)(B)(iii), 737(c). As an example, individuals A, B and C form ABC land
development partnership. A contributes plots Al and A2, each of which has a fair market value of
$100,000, and an adjusted tax basis of $75,000. B contributes his recently acquired plot B which has a
fair market value of $200,000 as well as a tax basis of $200,000. C makes a cash contribution of
$200,000. Under I.R.C. § 722 the partner's bases in their partnership interests are as follows: A,
$150,000; B, $200,000; and C, $200,000.
Difficulties arise and within five years, A accepts plot B in complete liquidation of her partnership
interest and B accepts plot Al as a partial liquidation of his partnership interest. The distribution to B
of property Al within five years gives rise to a gain which A must recognize under I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B).
The gain is the difference between the original fair market value of $100,00 less depreciation (not
applicable in this example) and its adjusted tax basis of $75,000. As a result, A recognizes a $25,000
gain and the adjusted tax basis in her partnership interest is increased accordingly from $150,000 to
$175,000. See id. § 704(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Section 737 requires that A also recognize a gain on her receipt of plot B. Section 737 states that "in
the case of any distribution by a partnership to a partner" the partner must recognize gain equal to the
lesser of either the amount by which the fair market value of the distributed property exceeds the
partner's basis in her partnership interest or the net precontribution gain. See id. § 737(a). In this case,
the fair market value of plot B is $200,000 and it exceeds A's partnership basis of $175,000 by $25,000.
This $25,000 excess is also equal to A's remaining precontribution gain. Therefore, A must recognize a
$25,000 gain on this distribution also.
I.R.C. § 737 does not apply to the distribution of property Al to B since B does not have any net
precontribution gain, and in any event the fair market value does not exceed his basis in his partnership
interest of $200,000.
33. See supra note 32.
1996]
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intending to manipulate the contribution and distribution rules would do so over five
years. It is far too long. Values of the relevant properties can change dramatically
over this period of time. Further, many (likely mostly) innocent transactions will
be caught in the net of I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737. An argument in favor of
such prophylactic treatment is that the tax-free contribution and distribution rules
are misguided. The argument would be that anytime a taxpayer exchanges an
interest in one property for, another via the partnership vehicle, the transaction
should be taxable. If that is the point, an argument exists not to provide a period
of limitation at all. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 should apply regardless of the
length of time between the contribution and distribution. Perhaps the five-year time
frame was chosen nonetheless for practical reasons (there does not appear to be any
guidance in the legislative history). Congress may have concluded that it would be
too difficult to maintain the data necessary to calculate gain and loss after five
years. If that is the case, similar limitations should appear elsewhere. Often they
do not. For example, there is no time limit on the application of I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(A).3
There are problems with the internal opeiations of both code sections.
Unscrupulous taxpayers may be inclined to manipulate the fair market values of the
relevant properties to avoid I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737.3' Even for honest
taxpayers it is difficult -to determine the fair market values of the many properties
that have no ready market.' How does one value a product under development,
for example? Sections 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 should generate significant litigation
on fair market value questions, further taxing an already overburdened court system.
Unfortunately, this issue is not unique to I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737. Fair
market value determinations are increasingly common in tax law (including the
operation of I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B)).
1. LR.C. § 737
Closing supposed loopholes tends to create others, a hyperlexis fundamental. In
the case of I.R.C. § 737, it is fairly easy to avoid its application. I.R.C. § 737 does
not present a problem as long as the fair market value of the distributed property
does not exceed the partner's basis in the partnership interest. A partner's basis in
his partnership interest is increased by his share of partnership debt under I.R.C.
34. Section 704(c)(1)(A) provides that "income, gain, loss and deduction with respect to property
contributed to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among the partners so as to take account of
the variation between th,.- basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time of
contribution.. .. " I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (1994).
35. Section 1.704-4(a)(3) of the Treasury Regulations provides a typical definition of fair market
value as the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant
fact. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-4(a)(3) (1995). This regulation also provides that the fair market value that
a partnership assigns to property will be regarded as correct provided (1) the value must be reasonably
agreed to, (2) the agreement must be reached among the partners at arn's length, and (3). the partners
must have sufficiently adverse interests. See id. These tests have been described as "meaningless mush"
in practice. See Cuff 1, supra note 28, at 18-22.
36. See Cuff 1, supra note 28, at 16.
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§ 752(a). 7 Thus, a partner's basis in his partnership interest could be increased to
an amount in excess of the fair market value of the distributed property by having
the partnership allocate a suitable amount of debt to the distributee partner. There
are a variety of ways of achieving this objective including leveraging the asset to
be distributed or, if the distributee will continue as a partner in the partnership, by
leveraging the assets remaining in the partnership." Alternatively, a partner could
contribute additional high basis property to obtain the increase in his partnership
interest basis. The property contribution might even be of loss property, which
could reduce the net precontribution gain.39
Alternatively, if the property distribution is of a type that can be broken up, the
distribution could be made in relatively small installments so that no single
distribution exceeds the partner's basis in his partnership interest." Or the
partnership may characterize the distribution as a draw or an advance. In the case
of a draw or an advance, the distributee partner's basis in the partnership interest is
determined as of the last day of the partnership's taxable year.4' At that time the
basis is increased under I.R.C. § 705 for the partner's share of partnership income
for the year, possibly increasing basis above the fair market value of the distributed
property.42 Additional partnership borrowing or reallocation of partnership debt
could also provide the necessary basis increase under I.R.C. § 752(a).
37. See Lee A. Sheppard, A Look at the Partnership Provisions of H.R. 11, 57 TAX NoTES 15, 16
(1992).
38. See Cuff 1, supra note 28, at 24-25. A partner shares in recourse debt based on the partner's
economic risk of loss with regard to the debt. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) (as amended in 1992). A
partner shares in nonrecourse debt based on a stacking rule. Nonrecourse debt is allocated to a partner
first based on that partner's share of "minimum gain," then based on her share of I.R.C. § 704(c) gain
if the partnership disposed of all partnership property subject to nonrecourse debt for no consideration
other than satisfaction of the debt, and finally based (essentially) on a partner's share of partnership
profits. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a) (1991).
If a property being distributed is subject to debt, then all of the partners' share of partnership debt goes
down by the secured debt, and the distributee partner's share of debt is increased by the debt to which
the distributed property is subject. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1991). The net increase in the
distributee partner's share of the debt increases his partnership interest for the purpose of determining
whether the fair market value of the distributed property exceeds his basis in the partnership interest. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.737-1(a)(3) (1995).
For example, assume a partner's predistribution tax basis in her partnership interest is $100,000,
including $10,000 of partnership debt. The partnership distributes property to the partner with a fair
market value of $190,000 in liquidation of the partner's partnership interest. The property is subject to
a $100,000 liability. There is a net increase in the partner's liability of $90,000 ($I00,000 less $10,000
preexisting liability share). This increases the partner's basis to $190,000 under I.R.C. § 752(a) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.737-1(a)(3). There thus is no I.R.C. § 737 gain on the distribution.
39. It has been suggested that this approach might be attacked as abusive, since it would be
motivated by tax avoidance and not business needs. See Juliann Avakian-Martin, Official Outlines IRS
Thinking on Forthcoming Partnership Regs., 59 TAx NOTES 852 (1993). I.R.C. § 737 regulations do
contain an antiabuse rule. See Treas. Reg. § 1.737-4 (1995).
40. See Sheppard, supra note 37, at 16.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii) (1995).
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.737-1(b)(3)(ii) (1995).
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As this discussion demonstrates, I.R.C. § 737 should rarely be a problem for the
experienced practitioner. It represents more of a trap for the unwary. Thus a code
section designed to combat transactions of highly sophisticated taxpayers will, for
the most part, not have that effect. Instead, it will catch the "little guy" who does
not have access to able tax counsel. Hyperlexis strikes again.
I.R.C. § 737 generates additional complexity through the need to preserve the
character of the gain inherent in contributed property. A partner might contribute
multiple properties, the sale of some of which would generate ordinary income,
whereas the sale of others would generate long or short term capital gain. Under the
regulations, on the distribution the partner recognizes gain proportionate to the gain
inherent in the contributed property.43 The character is determined as if the
property were sold to a third party by the partnership, thankfully without the special
characterization rules such as I.R.C. § 707(b)(2).M If 30% is ordinary income and
70% is capital gain, on the distribution of property to the partner any gain
recognized will be characterized the same way. In fact, gains and losses should be
placed in at least three baskets: ordinary, capital, and I.R.C. § 1231.' The gains
and losses in each basket are netted under the regulations. A basket with a net loss
is ignored. Rules like these make tax professionals want to open up a t-shirt shop
in Hawaii.47
I.R.C. § 737 does not apply if property contributed by a partner is distributed to
that same partner.' Seems straight forward? What if the property is fungible?
Does exactly the same property have to be distributed? What if the property is
improved before it "is distributed? Do the improvements to the property have to be
handled separately? What if a partner contributes the components and the
partnership distributes the finished product?. 9 A bit of good news: I.R.C. § 737
does not apply to the deemed distribution of property under I.R.C. § 708, to
partnership conversions or spinoffs, or to partnership incorporations (without a
43. See id. § 1.737-1(d).
44. See i. § 1.737-2(a). I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) applies to the sale or exchange of property which in the
hands of the transferee is property other than a capital asset. The gain is characterized as ordinary income
to the transferor if the sale or exchange is between a partner and a partnership, where the partner, directly
or indirectly, owns more than 50% of the capital or profits interest in the partnership. The same rule
applies if the sale or exchange is between two partnerships in which the same persons own, directly or
indirectly, more than 50% of the capital or profits interests in the partnerships. Unfortunately, I.R.C.
§ 707(b)(2) can apply in the case of I.R.C. § 704(c)(l)(B) transactions. See infra notes 55-60 and
accompanying text.
45. See Cuff 1, sup,-a note 28, at 36.
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.737-1(d) (1995).
47. My research ass.stant would like me to note that the rules have a similar effect on tax professors'
research assistants.
48. See I.R.C. .§ 737(d)(1) (1994).
49. See Cuff 1, supia note 28, at 42-55. If a partner contributes an interest in an entity, the interest
is not treated as previously contributed property to the extent that the value of the interest is attributable
to property contributed to the entity after the interest was contributed to the partnership. See Treas, Reg.
§ 1.737-2(d)(2) (1995). This regulation also has its hyperlexis impact. For example, how are new
liabilities treated? See Cuff 1, supra note 28, at 44-47.
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distribution of property to the partners)." There is a hyperlexis impact to even
these exemptions, but I won't belabor them here. The point has been made."
2. I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)
I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) has its own entertaining features. In many ways I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B) is the more curious of the two code sections. Here no hidden
exchange has occurred. A partner contributes property to a partnership, and the
partnership, for all anyone knows for perfectly valid business reasons, distributes
that property to someone else. It is possible that the contributing partner wants to
sell the property to the ultimate distributee. The disguised transaction would thus
be a contribution of property by one partner and cash by another, followed by a
distribution of property to the cash contributor and cash to the property contributor.
But at the point I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) applies, the property contributor has received
nothing, and there has been no sale of the property, so the partnership has received
nothing either. Why generate a taxable transaction? A logical time to tax the
contributing partner is when the cash is distributed to him. We do not need any new
rules for that result. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) already sufficiently provides for this tax
treatment. If the fact that I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B)'s two-year rule is only presumptive
and makes taxation too uncertain, make the two-year rule mandatory. 2 Recall also
that even without a law change, I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) is not Congress's only
weapon. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) requires gain recognition if the distribution is of money
and exceeds the taxpayer's basis in his partnership interest, as will often be the case
where the cash distribution is disproportionate. 3 In the case of any such dispropor-
tionate cash distribution, I.R.C. § 751(b) generally addresses ordinary income
avoidance.'
I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) should complicate the application of I.R.C. § 751(b).
Assume that an unrealized receivable contributed by one partner is distributed to
another partner. Further assume that the unrealized receivable appreciated in value
while held by the partnership (perhaps it bears a favorable rate of interest, or the
chances of collection improved). On the distribution, I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) only
taxes the original gain to the contributing partner. The remaining gain is taxed
under I.R.C. § 751(b) principles, making for some fairly complex calculations."
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.737-2(b), (c) (1995). A distribution of property by the transferee partnership
to a partner who was formerly a partner of the transferor partnership is subject to I.R.C. § 737 to the
extent it would have applied if the transferor partnership had distributed the property. See id. § 1.737-
2(b)(3).
51. See Cuff 1, supra note 28, at 39-41.
52. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
54. Under I.R.C. § 751(b), iFas a result of a non-pro rata distribution the partnership and the partner
exchange interests in ordinary income and nonordinary income property, a phantom, taxable exchange
is deemed to occur which is designed to insure that all the partners recognize their fair shares of ordinary
income.
55. See Christopher H. Hanna, Partnership Distributions: Whatever Happened to Nonrecognition?,
82 KY. L.J. 465, 506 (1994).
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I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) and its recently promulgated regulations have generated
many unresolved questions. For example, I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) taxes the
contributing partner as if the property is sold by the.partnership to the distributee
partner. If I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) is designed to address disguised sales by a
contributing partner, it makes more sense to consider the sale as being made by that
partner. If the partnership is the selling party, a host of new issues arise. I.R.C.
§ 707(b)(1) disallows losses on sales between a partnership and a partner owning
directly or by attribution more than 50% of the partnership.' I.R.C. § 707(b)(2)
provides that if there is a sale of property between a partnership and a partner
owning over 50% of the partnership directly or by attribution,' any gain recog-
nized to the transfieror is ordinary income provided the asset is other than a capital
asset in the hand; of the transferee." Do these provisions apply to the I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B) deemed sale?" The regulations answer this question in the
56. I.R.C. § 707(b1(3) attributes partnership ownership according to the constructive stock ownership
rules found in I.R.C. § 267(c). Conforming the language of section 267(c) to partnership interests, the
section states:
(I) [A partnership interest] owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a corporation,
partnership, estLte, or trust shall be considered as being owned proportionately by or for
its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries;
(2) Ah indiiidual shall be considered as owning the [partnership interest] owned.
directly or indirectly, by or for his family;
(4) The family of an individual shall include only his brothers and sisters .... spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants; and
(5) [A partrership interest] constructively owned by a person by reason of the
application of paragraph (1) shall, for the purpose of applying paragraph (1) [or] (2) ....
be treated as actually owned by such person, but [a partnership interest] constructively
owned by an individual by reason of the application of paragraph (2) ... shall not be
treated as owned1 by him for the purpose of again applying either of such paragraphs in
order to make another the constructive owner of such stock.
I.R.C. § 267(c) (1994) (alterations replacing "stock" with "a partnership interest" derived from application
of I.R.C. § 707(b)(3)).
57. As was the case with I.R.C. § 707(b)(3), I.R.C. § 1239 also turns to section 267(c) for guidance
in attributing partnership interest ownership to an individual. See I.R.C. § 1239(c); supra note 56.
58. I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) overlaps with I.R.C. § 1239, which presumably also applies in an IR.C.
§ 704()(1)(B) transaction.
59. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Final Regulations on Partnership Contributions and Distributions Will
Snare the Unsuspecting, 13 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 91, 94-95 (1996) [hereinafter Cuff 2].
Section 707(a) permits the recognition of the resulting gain or loss on the sale of an asset between
partner and partnership See I.R.C. § 707(a) (1994). However, the opportunity for abuse is evident. A
partner can sell to his partnership an asset that generates a paper loss, without losing control of the asset,
all the while recognizing a loss for federal income tax purposes. Section 707(b) curbs this to some extent
by disallowing losses firom sales or exchanges of property between a partnership and a person owning
more than a 50% interest in that partnership. See id. § 707(b)(1).
Creative opportunities also exist for sales of assets that generate a gain. A partner can sell a capital
asset to his partnership and recognize a capital gain. The partnership in turn receives the asset with a
stepped up basis for depreciation calculation. A partner, who is in a higher tax bracket than the
maximum capital gains rate, can receive a corresponding pass through depreciation deduction that has
a tax value exceeding his tax on the capital gain. To reduce this opportunity for abuse, both I.R.C.
§ 707(b)(2) and I.R.C. ji 1239 characterize the gain from the sale of property between a partnership and
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affirmative.60 This treatment often yields a novel result. A direct sale by the
contributing partner can often ignore I.R.C. § 707(b).6 ' A disguised sale cannot.
One could perhaps argue that it is a fair penalty for nefarious activities, i.e., trying
to disguise a sale, except for one fact: I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) is entirely too
mechanical. It applies regardless of any nefarious motives. Thus, a legitimate
business distribution to a partner four years after a contribution cannot only give the
contributing partner phantom income, but the section can characterize it as ordinary
income. Conversely, I.R.C. § 707(b)(1) can disallow a loss. This is just one
example of how a new code section not only creates complexity on its own but can
interact with other code sections to increase that complexity geometrically.
3. LR.C. § 708
This latter principle is also demonstrated by I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)'s interaction
with I.R.C. § 708. Under I.R.C. § 708, a partnership terminates if more than 50%
of the partnership interests are sold or exchanged within twelve months. Upon the
termination, the partnership is deemed to distribute its properties to the new and
continuing partners, typically on a pro rata basis. These partners are thereafter
deemed to have recontributed the properties back to the partnership.62 Under the
regulations the distribution does not trigger I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B), but the
recontribution subjects all of the partners to I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) in the future. 3
In other words, since under I.R.C. § 708 all partners are treated as having made a
contribution of property to the partnership, when under I.R.C. § 708 the property
deemed contributed by one partner is later actually distributed to another partner,
I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) applies.64 The regulations provide that I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)
only applies on the I.R.C. § 708 recontribution to the extent, in effect, it did not
already apply to a partner at the time of the I.R.C. § 708 termination.65 Presumably
this means that any previously existing I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) gain is allocated to the
partner who originally, actually contributed the property to the partnership. Any
a person owning more than a 50% interest in the partnership, as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 707(b)(2)
applies if the property is other than a capital asset in the hands of the transferee. I.R.C. § 1239 applies
if the property in the hands of the transferee is subject to the allowance for depreciation.
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-4(b) (1995).
61. I.R.C. § 707(b) only applies to sales and exchanges between a partner and a partnership or
between two commonly controlled partnerships. See supra notes 44-55.
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(iv) (1960). In response to the interaction between I.R.C. § 708
and I.R.C. § 704(c)(l)(B), the Service is considering amending the I.R.C. § 708 regulations to eliminate
the deemed property distribution. See Cuff 1, supra note 28, at 37; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(l)(iv).
63. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-4(c)(3), (a)(4)(ii) (1995).
64. Congress contemplated that I.R.C. § 708 would apply in this fashion. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-
247, at 1355 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2825; H.R. Rep. No. 102-1018, at 428 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2519.
65. Specifically, the regulation provides that I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) applies on the I.R.C. § 708
recontribution only "to the extent that the pre-termination built-in gain or loss, if any, on such property
would not have been allocated to the contributing partner under section 704(c)(1)(A) and § 1.704-3 on
a sale of the contributed property to an unrelated party immediately before the termination." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-4(a)(4)(ii) (1995).
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appreciation occurring after the original, actual contribution should be allocable to
all the partners pro rata after the I.R.C. § 708 transaction. However, the regulations
do not make that clear.
A property may be subject to two different I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) time frames.
To the extent I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) already applies at the time of the I.R.C. § 708
termination, the time frame may be the balance of the five-year term. To the extent
that the I.R.C. § 708 recontribution triggers I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B), a new five-year
term should start. 'What if the appreciation inherent in the property goes down, but
there is still appreciation?' Presumably, only the original contributor has exposure
under I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B). What if the property declines in value so much that it
has a loss inherent in it? I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) should apply to all of the partners
for five years after the I.R.C. § 708 recontribution, but since a loss is involved they
may not mind.
The analysis above assumes that the distribution under I.R.C. § 708 is pro rata.
While that is commonly assumed to be the case,67 it is not necessarily a foregone
conclusion. There is some ambiguity in the I.R.C. § 708 regulations in this
regard."0 Moreover, some have argued (with some support from I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B)'s legislative history) that any property actually contributed by a
partner prior to the I.R.C. § 708 termination should be deemed to be distributed to
that partner under I.R.C. § 708. 6' If true, only the original contributor is affected
by the provision of the I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) regulations providing that I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B) is triggered by the deemed I.R.C. § 708 recontribution.
Through the application of I.R.C. § 708, I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 can go
on applying well Fast the original five-year term. Indeed, I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)
and 737 could continue to apply indefinitely, provided there were repeated I.R.C.
§ 708 terminations. There are other problems to address as well. On the deemed
distribution of property under I.R.C. § 708, a partner's basis is first allocated to cash
and I.R.C. § 751 assets, and then to any other assets that are distributed. " On any
66. To keep mattets simple, I am assuming the property is not depreciable. Depreciation affects
I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) gain. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1), (2) ex. l(ii) (as amended in 1995).
67. See ARTHup B WILLIS ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 162.04 (5th ed. 1995).
68. See Treas. Reg, § 1.708-1(b)(l)(iv) (1960). The regulation provides that when a partnership is
terminated by a sale or exchange, the partnership is deemed to distribute its properties to the purchaser
and the other remaining partners in proportion to their respective interests in the partnership properties.
See id. The question is what is a partner's interest in a partnership property which that partner contributed
to the partnership. If gain on the sale will be allocated to the partner under I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) and
a distribution of the property to another partner will result in gain under I.R.C. § 704(c)(I)(B), there is
an argument that the partner holds the entire interest in the property at least if it has not appreciated
while held by the partnership. If so, on the deemed distribution of the property by the partnership under
I.R.C. § 708, the property should be deemed to be distributed to the contributing partner.
69. See Cuff 2, supra note 59, at 100. The legislative history to I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(l)(B) and 737
appears to contemplate that on the I.R.C. § 708 distribution the property contributed by a partner will
be distributed to that same partner, at least to the extent of any built-in gain remaining in the property.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-47, at 1355 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2825; H.R. REP. No. 102-
1018, at 428 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2519.
70. See I.R.C. § 732(c) (1994).
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liquidation, including an I.R.C. § 708 liquidation, a partner can take a higher basis
in the distributed asset than that which the partnership had.7' On the I.R.C. § 708
recontribution the partnership takes a carryover basis in the asset under I.R.C.
§ 723. The basis step-up to the distributee partner could eliminate any gain inherent
in property before the I.R.C. § 708 termination and thus the gain to which I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B) 2 once would have applied. Conversely, it could increase the I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B) gain. Was either result intended? Likely the answer is no. These
anomalies are less likely to occur if property contributed by a partner is viewed as
being distributed to that partner. The bases are more likely to match up properly,
which is in part the argument for having the I.R.C. § 708 distribution made in that
fashion. However, while this approach may solve one problem, it will create
another. If there is a disproportionate distribution of a partnership's I.R.C. § 751
assets, presumably including a deemed distribution under I.R.C. § 708, I.R.C.
§ 751(b) can apply.
With the application of I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) to I.R.C. § 708 transactions, the law
is far afield from where it started. The original motivation was to prevent the
partnership contribution and distribution rules from being used to disguise sales and
other taxable transactions. In the case of a pro rata I.R.C. § 708 distribution, all the
continuing partners are brought into I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) not because of any
improper purpose, not even because of any actual contribution of property, but
because of a deemed contribution. Indeed, the partners who purchased their
partnership interests may never make a contribution to the partnership but are
nevertheless brought within I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B). The I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) rules
are applying blindly, pulling perfectly innocent partners into their maw, not because
of any hidden property sale, but because of the mechanical operation of two code
sections. Clearly, the application of I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) in the I.R.C. § 708
context does not make a lot of sense. It is, however, a classic demonstration of
hyperlexis principles. The law is feeding on itself.
The problematic application of I.R.C. § 708 has generated the rare beneficial
hyperlexis effect. To fix the fix, the Service has proposed regulations to replace the
current distribution-recontribution rules of the existing I.R.C. § 708 regulations.
Under the proposed regulations, if a partnership is terminated under I.R.C. § 708,
the partnership is deemed to transfer all of its assets and liabilities to a new
partnership.74 Immediately thereafter, the terminated partnership is deemed to
distribute an interest in the new partnership to the purchasing and continuing
partners, who would substitute the basis in their old partnership interest for the basis
71. See id. Basis is first allocated to cash and I.R.C. § 751 assets. Any remaining basis is allocated
to other distributed assets, in proportion to their respective basis to the partnership, even if that means
giving the partner a higher basis than that of the partnership in the distributed assets.
72. And, of course, I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (1994).
73. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(iv). In the preamble to the proposed regulation the Service
specifically states that the manner in which the existing I.R.C. § 708 regulations apply to I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(l)(B) transactions motivated promulgating the proposed regulatory change.
74. See id.
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in the new one under I.R.C. § 732(c)." One benefit of this change is that there no
longer is a deemed contribution of assets by the partner which could trigger I.R.C.
§ 704(c)(1)(B), and thus the problem discussed above would no longer exist. If that
were the only benefit, nothing more than a traditional hyperlexis effect would be
involved: One change necessitating another change. However, there are other
problems with the existing I.R.C. § 708 regulations which the proposed rule also
repairs. I will leave a more detailed discussion of these problems to other, more
specialized efforts,' but in brief: Currently, if the deemed I.R.C. § 708 distribution
of money exceeds a partner's basis in his partnership interest, the partner realizes
a gain under I.R.C. § 731(a)(1), notwithstanding the fact that he never actually
receives any cash, assuming the business of the partnership is continued. The
amount of any deemed money distribution can be increased, and therefore the
problem exacerbated, by any deemed distribution of money under I.R.C. § 752(b)"'
resulting from a shift in the manner in which liabilities are shared (sort of a
deemed-deemed distribution). As discussed above, there also can be a shifting of
basis." A partner' basis in the partnership interest is first allocated to money and
I.R.C. § 751 assets and then to other assets.' The allocation to the other assets is
made in proportion to their respective bases to the partnership.' Assume a new
partner purchases a 51% partnership interest for $1 million and receives by way of
an I.R.C. § 708 distribution equipment with a basis and fair market value of
$100,000 and a depreciable life of five years and real estate with a basis of zero,
a fair market value of $900,000, and a depreciable life of thirty-nine years. Since
the partnership's basis in the real estate is zero, the partner's partnership interest
basis of $1 million is allocated exclusively to the equipment, and the partnership
takes that stepped-up basis in the equipment on the deemed recontribution to the
partnership."' Both cf these problems would also be eliminated by the new I.R.C.
§ 708 regulation since the partners would no longer receive a deemed distribution
of partnership assets, only the interest in the new partnership. '2 The proposed
regulation is a true rarity. It not only mends, it simplifies the law a bit.
75. See id.
76. For an excellent ,xticle discussing the proposed I.R.C. § 708 regulation, see Richard M. Lipton,
Partnership Deemed Terminations Will Be Simpler Under New Proposed Regulations, 85 J. TAX'N 133
(1996).
77. Unde" I.R.C. § 752(b) (1994), a partner is deemed to receive a distribution of money to the
extent her share of partnership liabilities are decreased.
78. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
79. See I.R.C. § 732(c) (1994).
80. See id. § 732(c)(2). This same rule would apply to the allocation to the I.R.C. § 751 assets if
the partner had insufficient basis to take a full carryover basis in those assets. See id. § 732(c)(1).
81. I.R.C. § 732(d) can force the equivalent of an I.R.C. § 754 election if basis is shifted from
nondepreciable to depreciable assets. It does not appear to apply where there is a shift between
depreciable assets with different depreciable live. See Treas. Reg. § 1.732-1(d)(4)(ii) (1960); Lipton,
supra note 76, at 135.
82. See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text. Under the rules discussed above, a partner would
take the same basis as she had in her partnership basis in the old partnership, assuming no liability shift.
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D. Philosophies
Is it appropriate to repeal much of the effectiveness of the tax-free distribution
rules for partners who contribute property? Some feel the answer to this question
is yes and, unsurprisingly given hyperlexis principles, have proposed highly complex
alternative systems to address the problem, gutting much of subchapter K in the
process.' True, under subchapter K some exchange of interest in properties might
be achieved on a tax-free basis. However, ordinarily the transactions are so
attenuated with time and risk that it is hard to see how much tax avoidance could
go on. For example, even without I.R.C. § 737, any distribution to the contributing
partner within two years subjects the transaction to scrutiny under I.R.C.
§ 707(a)(2)(B)Y' Any partner willing to wait over two years to make a tax-free
exchange is taking a big risk that property values will change in an unfavorable
way, as is the partnership (and values are hardly locked in stone for the first two
years). It is unlikely that either a partner or a partnership will bind itself to such an
exchange over a two-year time period without additional guarantees, guarantees that
could trigger sale treatment under the I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) regulations.' True, the
two-year rule of I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) regulations is presumptive, not automatic. If
lack of certainty is the concern, make it automatic rather than burden taxpayers with
I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 and their additional breadth and complexity.
Is the time frame irrelevant? Is any potential for tax-free property exchanges so
offensive that it needs to be aggressively addressed? If partnerships were primarily
being used to end-run I.R.C. § 1001, 8; perhaps the loss to the fisc would be so
great that an aggressive response even with all of is complexities could be justified.
The reality is, however, that mixing bowl transactions are of more interest to
speakers at tax seminars and to writers of law review articles than to practitioners
structuring actual transactions. One commentator noted that mixing bowl
transactions "may have been a great tax loophole in theory, but, in fact, that
loophole is virtually impossible to exploit in the real world." ' Further, if tax-free
83. See Gergen, supra note 12; see also John P. Steines, Jr., Commentary, Unneeded Reform, 47
TAx L. REV. 239 (1991) (criticizing Professor Gergen's proposals in part based on their extraordinary
complexity); Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation, 47 TAX L. REv. 105 (1991) (proposing
to require corporate-like treatment of the distribution of property, meaning that the partnership would be
required to recognize gain inherent in distributed property, except in the case of I.R.C. § 708 terminations
and when the property is distributed to the partner who contributed it).
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(1) (1992); see supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
85. See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b) (1992); see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
86. Under I.R.C. § 1001(a), gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property is measured
by the difference between the amount received and the adjusted basis. Under I.R.C. § 1001(c) that gain
or loss is recognized for tax purposes unless the Code elsewhere provides otherwise.
87. Roundtable Discussion on Partnership Taxation with William S. McKee, Blake D. Rubin, and
R. Donald Turlington, 12 A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N 48, 48 (1993). Turlington states that "[there is a lot more
smoke than fire in this particular type of transaction. It is true that mixing bowl transactions have
become the rage of speakers on the Subchapter K circuit. But they certainly have not become the rage
of business men and women who are trying to buy and sell assets. Mixing bowl transactions may have
been a great tax loophole in theory, but, in fact, that loophole is virtually impossible to exploit in the real
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exchanges are the worry, a total revamping of subchapter K would be in order.
From that perspective, I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 are mere fig leafs.
Subchapter K and its tax-free contribution and distribution rules have been around
for a long time. Tley have not provided a method to bankrupt the fisc. I.R.C. §§
704(c)(1)(B) and 737 are an overreaction. There is a tendency for academics and
other commentators to look at things from the perspective of how the current system
can be abused. It is true that abuses are possible. But perhaps a more helpful
approach is to ask not only whether abuses are possible but also whether the likely
abuses are of sufficient severity to justify a statutory change." Further, as the
above discussion demonstrates, the interaction of different code sections creates new
complexities and arabiguities likely uncontemplated at the time of the new statute's
passage. Inevitably, solving one problem can create a host of others. If the
underlying problem involves relatively few transactions with relatively little revenue
loss, it is probably better to live with the problem than to try to fix it. The mixing
bowl transactions that I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 address were not common
enough to justify the heavy-handed approach used. To make matters worse, many
innocent transactions are also subject to these code sections. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)
and 737 represent En inappropriate fix and should be repealed."
III. Section 736
Historically, when someone purchased a business, payments made for the
goodwill of the bu;iness could not generate tax deductions.' Any such payment
had to be capitalized and could not be amortized.9 The advent of I.R.C. § 197
improved things from the taxpayer's perspective, permitting goodwill to be
amortized over fifteen years.' However, long before I.R.C. § 197 came into being,
subchapter K provided a means to circumvent the general rule. Prior to 1993, if a
partner's interest in a partnership was liquidated, payments attributable to partnership
goodwill could be effectively deducted. 3 The only limitation was that the
world." Id. at 48. At page 49 Rubin states that "many more mixing bowl partnerships have been
discussed than actually c!one." Id. at 49.
88. For a perspecti-ie of an academic that looks more at the former, see Rebecca S. Rudnick,
Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 229 (1993).
89. Suggestions for the repeal of I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 have been made by others in the
academy. See Hanna, supra note 55, at 529.
90. The regulations provide that the price paid for a business is to be allocated to its tangible and
intangible assets to. the extent of their fair market value. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d) (1988).
Any amount paid in excess of the fair market value of the partnership's assets, is allocated to goodwill
or going concern value. See id. § 1.1060-IT(e).
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
92. See I.R.C. § 197(a) (1994). This code section actually should be a revenue raiser. The revenue
losses for the ability to amortize goodwill are most likely more than offset by revenue gains resulting
from the fact that covenants not to compete also are amortized over 15 years. See Glenn F. Mackles, Is-
Year Amortization of Purchased Intangible Assets-Some Winners, Some Losers, 79 J. TAX'N 332, 334
(1993). Previously, they could be amortized over the term of the covenant. See BITrKER & MCMAHON,
supra note 14, 1 14.4[5],
93. See I.R.C. § 736(a), (b)(2)(B) (1988).
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partnership agreement could not contain a provision providing for payments for
goodwill." This circumstance is often called "unstated goodwill." Payments to a
retiring partner attributable to unstated goodwill might come from partnership profits
or they might be fixed in amount. In the former case, I.R.C. § 736(a) treated the
retiring partner as receiving a distributive share of partnership income (of whatever
character), reducing the shares taxable to the continuing partners and giving them
the equivalent of a deduction.95 In the latter case, I.R.C. § 736(a) treated the
retiring partner as receiving a guaranteed payment, characterized as ordinary
income." The guaranteed payment was deductible to the partnership.' Unlike
some of the transactions discussed in this article about which commentators have
complained, the provisions of I.R.C. § 736(a) were commonly used.
Goodwill can, of course, be "stated." In that case the partnership agreement
specifically provides that payments to a retiring partner include payments for
partnership goodwill. Payments for stated goodwill are given distribution
treatment." Distribution treatment means no deduction to the partnership for
goodwill payments. Instead, moneys distributed first recover a partner's basis in her
partnership interest.' Any money distributed in excess of basis normally generates
capital gain to the distributee partner.'"
If negotiations were at arm's length and no preexisting agreement was in place,
the retiring partner would have to be paid more to get him to agree to accept, for
example, guaranteed payment and ordinary income treatment instead of the more
favorable recovery of basis followed by capital gain. Often the continuing partners
could justify paying more in order to obtain a current deduction. It was also not
unusual for the partners to agree at the outset to leave goodwill unstated.
A substantial potential for abuse also existed. A putative purchaser of a business
first formed a partnership with the owner. Initially the purchaser made a cash
contribution to the partnership, and the owner contributed the assets of the business.
Under the partnership agreement goodwill was unstated. The partnership then
liquidated the interest of the original owner, arguably receiving a deduction for the
payments made for unstated goodwill.' A direct purchase of the business assets
by the buyer would have required goodwill to be capitalized (and now amortized
over fifteen years under I.R.C. § 197). It should be noted that I.R.C. § 197 did not
level the playing field, since payments to retiring partners are usually made over
94. See id.
95. See id. § 736(a)(1), (b)(2).
96. See id. §§ 736(a)(2), (b)(2), 707(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(4). (b)(3) (as amended in 1965).
97. See I.R.C. §§ 707(c), 162 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(3), (4) (as amended in 1965);
WILLIAM S. McKEE ETAL,. FEDERALTAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERSI 22.04 (Supp. 1986).
98. See I.R.C. § 736(b)(1), (2) (1994).
99. See id. § 731(a)(1) (subject to I.R.C. §§ 736(a), 751(b)).
100. See id. §§ 731(a)(1), 1222, 1223.
101. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 782
(1993). Also, for a thorough discussion on the tax treatment of transactions between withdrawing and
remaiiiing partners after the changes brought about by the enactment of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, see James E. Tierney, Reassessing Sales and Liquidations of Partnership Interests after the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 1 FLA. TAx REv. 681 (1994).
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periods far shorter than fifteen years. Thus, the payments for unstated goodwill
were deductible over far shorter periods as well.
Permitting payments for goodwill to be commonly deducted in the partnership
context when that treatment is not available in other contexts never made much
sense. Reform had been in order for some time, and it was finally instituted in
1993. A simple solution was to amend I.R.C. § 736 to eliminate the special
treatment given to goodwill.
As is unfortunately common, Congress did not take the simple approach. Instead
it instituted the reform only for partnerships in- which capital is a "material income
producing factor" and for payments to limited partners. 2 Under these circumstan-
ces, payments to a partner for goodwill can no longer be effectively deducted."
Instead, such payments fall under the distribution rules discussed above."° For
payments to general partners in partnerships in which capital is not a material
producing factor, i.e., service partnerships, the old rules continue to apply. The
committee report provides that "general partners in service partnerships do not
ordinarily value goodwill in liquidating partners."' 5 Of course, under the old rule
they did not have to." It is also true that in service partnerships, goodwill is often
tied more to the individual partners rather than the partnership as such. Thus,
service partnerships often do not have much in the way of goodwill that needs to
be valued, but that circumstance does not invariably apply. Some service
partnerships, including many of the large law and accounting firms, do have
significant goodwill apart from their partners. Moreover, why make a special rule
for service and nonservice partnerships? It only makes the code more complicated
and is not needed. Service partnerships without partnership goodwill should not
have too much difficulty demonstrating the purpose of the payments."
The elimination of favorable treatment for goodwill for all partnerships permits
Congress to take a more radical step toward simplification: the outright repeal of
I.R.C. § 736. There is little reason for I.R.C. § 736 without the special provision
for goodwill. I.R.C. § 736 insures that money payments for unrealized receivables
are given ordinary income treatment." However, that provision is redundant and
adds complexity to the code. I.R.C. § 751(b)"° also contains a provision which
102. See I.R.C. § 736(b)(3) (1994).
103. To the extent an I.R.C. § 754 election is in effect, I.R.C. § 197 may be available to amortize
basis created in goodwill by the payments over 15 years.
104. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
105. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 782 (1993).
106. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
107. See I.R.C. § 1060 (1994).
108. See id. § 736(b)(2).
109. Actually, I.R.C. § 751(b), designed to prevent taxpayers from converting ordinary income into
capital gains, has itself been the subject of substantial criticism. I.R.C. § 751(b) is a highly complex
provision, and is another sledgehammer approach to what is, at least for partnerships of unrelated
partners, not a widespread problem. In most circumstances, partners of unrelated partners are not likely
to permit a shift of ordinary income and capital gains amongst themselves, since the benefit to one will
be a disadvantage to the other. Those few circumstances where such partners might agree, such as where
one has an expiring net op,-rating loss carry forward, are too few in number for such a complex statutory
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provides that money distributions to partners attributable to unrealized receivables
are given ordinary income treatment. This provision would apply to payments to
retiring partners but for the special rule of I.R.C. § 736. Why have the rule in two
places, especially since I.R.C. § 751(b) can already apply to retiring partners? I.R.C.
§ 751(b) also provides for ordinary income treatment to retiring partners, and all
other distributees, to the extent a money distribution is attributable to substantially
appreciated inventory. There is no need to have these rules in two places for
payments to retiring partners and in one place for other distributees. The repeal of
I.R.C. § 736 insures that the rules are in one place for everyone. The regulations
under I.R.C. § 751(b) would have to be amended to provide a methodology for
determining what portion of a payment is covered by I.R.C. § 751(b) when
payments are made over time, a comfortably surmountable obstacle."'
Whether or not capital is a material income-producing factor, I.R.C. § 736(a) not
only applies to payments for unrealized receivables but also to premium payments
(i.e., payments in excess of the fair market value of the interest being retired)."
There is no obvious reason for this. If a partner sells the partnership interest to a
third party for more than its fair market value, the excess is capital gain."' Why
is the result different if the partnership pays a premium? If I.R.C. § 736 is repealed,
premium payments fall under the distribution rules, which means that if the partner
recovers an amount in excess of basis, any gain is capital in nature,"3 the same
result as on a sale. It seems unlikely that the characterization change represents
much cost to the fisc. Thus, premium payments do not constitute a basis for the
continued existence of I.R.C. § 736.
The changes to I.R.C. § 736 are yet another example of how little thought seems
to be given to making the code simple and comprehensible. Hyperlexis rules. The
repeal of I.R.C. § 736 would be a helpful step toward more simplification and less
hyperlexis."'
response. Recommendations for the repeal of I.R.C. § 751(b) go back to 1957. That recommendation
was made again in 1982. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER
K, at 51, 54 (1982) [hereinafter ALI]. The repeal should generate little, if any, revenue loss, since the
overall amount of ordinary income that is recognized remains unaffected. If it is retained, I.R.C. § 751(b)
should be limited to partnerships in which related partners own over half of the interests in the
partnership. Only then is there any real likelihood of an ordinary income shift. A complete repeal still
makes more sense. When I.R.C. § 75 1(b) was enacted, there was a 66% differential between capital gains
and ordinary income. See ALl, supra, at 52. Now that differential may be as little as 11.6 points (39.6%
maximum rate on ordinary income versus 28% maximum rate on capital gains). See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d),
(h) (1994). I.R.C. § 751(b) is not worth the trouble.
110. See Treas. Reg. 1.736-I(b)(7), exp. 1.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1965); WILLIS Er AL., supra note 67, § 156.05.
112. See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221, 1222 (1994).
113. See id. § 731(a)(1).
114. The author wishes to thank Professor Robert Keller of the University of Maryland School of
Law for what now does not appear before the conclusion.
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IV. Conclusion
Acknowledging hyperlexis is an act of humility. Law changes should be made
only after recognizing the propensity for human error. Tomorrow's circumstances
may make today's brilliant idea seem foolish and shortsighted. A legal utopia is not
within our ken. Yet, while we acknowledge the truth of that statement, not too far
beneath the surface seems to reside a belief that it can be achieved. Why else do
we create laws at such a prodigious pace and seemingly respond to every ill with
at least a proposal for a new law? The test should not just be whether the proposed
change constitutes an improvement but whether the underlying problem is
substantial. It might be best to have a presumption against a law change. If that
presumption is overcome, the bias should be in favor of simplification - with the
realization that a complex system which cannot be understood or properly enforced
is not fair, regardles3 of its nominal equity.
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